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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a DNN bottleneck reinforcement scheme to
alleviate the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) against
adversarial attacks. Typical DNN classifiers encode the input image
into a compressed latent representation more suitable for inference.
This information bottleneck makes a trade-off between the image-
specific structure and class-specific information in an image. By
reinforcing the former while maintaining the latter, any redundant
information, be it adversarial or not, should be removed from the
latent representation. Hence, this paper proposes to jointly train
an auto-encoder (AE) sharing the same encoding weights with the
visual classifier. In order to reinforce the information bottleneck,
we introduce the multi-scale low-pass objective and multi-scale
high-frequency communication for better frequency steering in the
network. Unlike existing approaches, our scheme is the first reform-
ing defense per se which keeps the classifier structure untouched
without appending any pre-processing head and is trained with
clean images only. Extensive experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet demonstrate the strong defense of our method against
various adversarial attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software and application security;
• Computing methodologies→ Object recognition.
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Figure 1: Illustration of ourDefend++: defending adversarial
examples via DNN bottleneck reinforcement. The structure
of a classifier is untouched but split into two parts (E+C). A
specifically designed D-ecoder is appended during the train-
ing to form an auto-encoder (E+D).The structure is trained
on clean images only to jointly minimize the classification
(E+C) and the reconstruction (E+D) losses.
USA.. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 9 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3394171.
3413604
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning achieves excellent performance in various multime-
dia and computer vision tasks [12, 27, 32], but it has weaknesses.
Researchers have observed that specially crafted perturbations to
images/videos lead to total failure of visual recognition [6, 11, 29].
Surprisingly, these perturbations have very small amplitude so they
are barely perceptible. It means that in the image space, natural
images lie close to the class boundary and are easy to be perturbed.
The literature on adversarial images considers two scenarios.
In the while-box scenario, the attacker knows everything about
the classifier. The backpropagation computes the gradient of this
classifier’s loss w.r.t. the image pixel values [33]. It indicates the
infinitesimal perturbation in the image space dragging the image
closer to the class boundary [29]. This operation can be iterated
until the image crosses the boundary so that the model prediction
is wrong [13]. Adversarial examples also happen to transfer across
different models. In the black-box scenario, the attacker is oblivious
to the target model internals. Yet, by observing the target’s outputs
for many inputs, the attacker can train his own model mimicking
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the target. By leveraging transferability, a white-box attack on his
own classifier often deludes other black-box models [21].
Many defenses have been proposed but they resort to few dif-
ferent mechanisms. One idea coined as gradient masking [2, 23]
targets the core of white-box attacks, the computation of gradient,
by blocking the backpropagations. Yet, gradient masking has been
shown to give a false sense of security [4]: this defense is not effi-
cient against black-box attacks, which are free from any gradient
computation on the target model.
Adversarial training robustifies the classifier by pushing the
class boundary away so that adversarial images lie in the true
class region [6, 29]. The fine-tuning of model parameters is time-
consuming. This is why adversarial training usually considers fast
but simple attacks. Its strength against more elaborated attacks
remains questionable.
A good defense should not be dedicated to any specific attack or
mechanism, which we conceptualize as its universality. The class
boundaries learned by the classifier are valid over the manifold of
natural images, while perturbations look like noise and perturbed
images are not lying on the manifold of natural images; the infer-
ence of the classifier can be awfully wrong when probing images
off this manifold. This motivates pre-processing the input image in
front of the classifier [21]. The goal is to reform suspicious images,
i.e. to project them back onto the manifold of natural images [1].
The most popular choice for this front-end pre-processing is an
auto-encoder (AE) [1, 7, 15]. It is usually trained with adversarial
examples forged bymany attacks. Few-shot learning can be adopted
to accelerate this process [18]. Nevertheless, training it with clean
images can strongly enforce the universality of the defense. This is
recently achieved in [10].
This paper proposes to defend adversarial examples via DNN
bottleneck reinforcement, which we call it Defend++. It pertains to
the defense trend of universality yet is not a separated front-end
input reformer. Instead, our idea is to merge the reformer (i.e. AE)
with the early layers of the classifier so that both functionalities
are jointly trained. Once training is finished, the inference of the
classifier is disjointed from the AE (see Fig. 1). Our architecture
can be seen in two ways: it is a classifier working directly over
the internal latent space representation of the AE (instead of being
connected at its output). From another point of view, it is a visual
classifier whose first layers are jointly trained for both classification
and reconstruction.
Our motivation is based on the following view of a classifier. A
DNN encodes an image into a compressed latent representation
compressing the image-specific structure (i.e. edges, corners, and re-
gions) to concentrate the class-specific information (i.e. object size,
location, and common traits of the class). It has been theoretically
justified as necessary for better classification by the concept of in-
formation bottleneck [26]. If we could reinforce the image-specific
structure while maintaining the class-specific information, any re-
dundant information, adversary or not, would be removed without
harming the prediction. This information bottleneck reinforcement
has to take place inside the network.
Due to the fact that adversarial perturbations happen to be high
frequency in nature, we reinforce the information bottleneck with
frequency steering in the AE. We introduce the 1) multi-scale low-
pass objective to gradually reconstruct the image from low-level
structure to high-level details; 2) multi-scale high-frequency com-
munication to separate the prediction of high-frequency bands from
lowpass images and connect them to different parts of the encoder
for high-level communications. To achieve the universality, the
training of Defend++ deals with clean images only. We do not alter
the original classifier structure and no pre-processing is placed up
front. Details of the classifier and training strategy are public. Our
method is both attack agnostic and scenario agnostic.
The contribution of Defend++ is three-fold:
• We improve the universal defensive ability of the classifier
by jointly learning an AE with it sharing the same encoding
weights and on clean images only.
• We reinforce the network information bottleneck by intro-
ducing the multi-scale low-pass objective and multi-scale
high-frequency communication for the AE.
• We conduct extensive experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet benchmarks and demonstrate strong defense of
our Defend++ against various adversarial attacks.
To our knowledge, Defend++ is the first reforming defense that
requires neither modification on the architecture of classification
net, nor adversarial data for training.
2 RELATEDWORKS
This section surveys adversarial learning from the attack and de-
fense perspective, respectively.Wemainly reviewwhite-box attacks
as they are the hardest to defend.
2.1 Attack methods
All white-box attacks benefit from the cheap computation of the
gradient direction of the loss thanks to the backpropagation. In the
initial discovery of adversarial examples in [29], the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) minimizes a first-order approximation of the
loss over the ball of ℓ∞ norm ϵ . Kurakin et al. [13] further introduce
a basic iterative method (BIM) by repeating FGSM for several steps.
Carlini-Wagner [4] looks for the adversarial perturbation of mini-
mal ℓ2 norm. The solution is given by a Lagrangian formulation that
combines the gradients of the loss and the Euclidean distortion. Yet,
C&W requires a high number of iterations as several Lagrangian
multiplier values are tested. Recently, Rony et al. [25] introduce
an efficient attack quickly finding an adversarial image and then
refining it to minimize its distortion. This is done by decoupling
the direction and norm (DDN) of the perturbations.
2.2 Defense methods
The first counter-attack, gradient masking, blocks the backpropaga-
tion, which is at the core of any white-box attack, by introducing
some randomization [30], smooth labels [2, 23], soft feature se-
lections [9], and regularizers [22] to make the model output less
sensitive to the perturbation on input. The classification structure
is often modified in these works [9, 30]. Also, there exists a vulner-
ability against non gradient-based attacks (black-box) where the
attacker is free from differentiating proxies of these methods to
circumvent the defense. This is outlined in [4].
Adversarial training is a promising idea where a network is re-
trained with adversarial images. It performs well on small datasets
such as MNIST and CIFAR, but decreases accuracy on large-scale
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Figure 2: First and third row: lowpass filtered images and
corresponding frequency maps via DCT. Second and fourth
row: Pyramid images and corresponding frequency maps
via DCT.
datasets like ImageNet [13]. It is much costly. An attack has to
be mounted against a model, anytime that model is updated, new
adversarial images must be generated. This is the reason why adver-
sarial training only uses fast attacks like FGSM which are not very
powerful. The status may change in the future with the invention
of fast and efficient attacks like DDN [25].
A third idea is to detect adversarial images [14, 17]. This amounts
to add the extra class “suspicious images" as a possible output of
the classifier. The attack is made harder as it must delude both the
detector and the classifier. Training usually needs adversarial exam-
ples to minimize the false negative detection rate. This questions
their ability to detect new attacks [3]. As far as we know, [19] is
the only detector trained on clean images only.
A fourth idea is to utilize a pre-processing head in charge of
filtering out any perturbations if existed. This is usually called a
reformer. Dziugaite et al. [5] report that JPEG compression can
reverse small adversarial perturbations. Several variants, such as
feature squeezing [31], pixel defend [28] and distillation [16], are
further proposed to mitigate adversarial attacks. Meng et al. [21]
see the reformer as a projection of the input onto the manifold of
clean data. Gu et al. [7] were the first to propose an AE as a reformer.
Liao et al. [15] introduce a high-level representation guided denoiser
within the AE. Yet, these advanced reformers mostly need training
with adversarial examples, and the same question as for adversarial
training and detection arises: how do they perform against attacks
not encompassed in their training?
The recent paper [10] shuts down the concern by proposing an
efficient reformer (AE) that is trained without adversarial images.
Its reformer is still separated from the classifier, and is carefully
designed to compress over image bits with additional Gaussian
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Figure 3: A simple auto-encoder (AE) with hourglass struc-
ture. We use E and D to denote the encoding and decoding
block, respectively: EM−1 (DM−1) signifies a stack of encod-
ing (decoding) blocks, while the others arewith single block.
noises. Our AE instead shares the encoding part with the classifica-
tion network and is jointly trained with the classifier without any
additional noises. Moreover, [10] assumes that the attacker knows
the classifier but not the reformer. Ours is however totally open to
attacker. We believe a complete white-box scenario makes more
sense as nothing prevents the attacker to reproduce the reformer.
3 METHOD
3.1 Problem definition
Given a visual recognition task, i.e. classification, the target of this
work is to learn a robust model that generalizes on a wide range
of clean images and defenses against various adversarial examples.
In our setting, the model defensive ability can only be improved
during classification training without whistles and bells. This is
very challenging, but any effective method derived from this setting
can be especially helpful.
3.2 Motivation
A typical classification network consists of multiple convolutional
layers and several fully connected (fc) layers. The series of convo-
lutional layers is regarded as an encoder producing a latent repre-
sentation of the image, while fc layers act as a classifier making
prediction upon it. This partition is very schematic and indeed
any split of the network in two can be loosely seen as an encoder
followed by a classifier.
This latent representation contains two-fold information: the
image structural information, i.e. edges, corners and regions, that
are most visually distinguishable; the class-specific information, i.e.
object size, location and appearance, that are most similar to others
of the same class. There exist competitions between the two forces
due to the nature of classification training. Intuitively, if we could
reinforce the first fold while retaining the second fold information,
any redundant information should be removed from the image
representation and does no harm to the network prediction.
Referring to the adversary generation process, the impercepti-
ble perturbation can be regarded as additional noise with some
particular structures. It does not affect the original structure of
the image but rather reflects the redundant information of the im-
age [10]. A common approach to remove image redundancy is to
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Figure 4: Overview of the reconstruction part of Defend++. The original image is low-pass filtered via DCT to createmulti-scale
ground truth for the decoder learning. Each decoding block D is formed withU and H modules just like in a Laplace pyramid
to separately tune the importance of each frequency band.
train an auto-encoder (AE). Previous methods employ AE for ad-
versarial defense [7, 10, 15] as an independent network for input
transformation. In our Defend++, the AE is jointly learnt with the
classification net on clean images only. Another difference is that
we do not modify the architecture of the classifier once it is given.
The encoder of the AE is indeed composed by the first layers of the
classification net. In other words, the weights of these layers are
learnt by merging both classification and reconstruction losses.
3.3 DNN bottleneck reinforcement
AEs are neural networks that aim to copy their inputs to their
outputs. They work by compressing the input into a latent-space
representation, then reconstructing the output from this represen-
tation. The former part is conceptualized as an encoder removing
the redundant information from the image while the latter part is a
decoder reconstructing the image. The encoder consists of a set of
convolutional layers downsampling the image while the decoder is
a set of deconvolutional layers upsampling the image.
In order to distill the encoded knowledge between the classifi-
cation net and the AE, we share the encoder of the AE with that
of the classification net. Notice that when the classification net is
too deep or too shallow, we can cut or extend the encoding blocks
of the network considered as the encoder to an appropriate length.
The decoder design is an open problem: a straightforward way is
to employ the so-called hourglass structure [24] where each decod-
ing block is a mirrored version of the encoding block chaining the
layers in reverse order (see Fig. 3). Here we use encoding/decoding
blocks to refer to a stack of layers in the network where the input is
only downsampled/upsampled once with a factor of 2 in this block.
For instance, given a classifier ResNet-18, its encoding block nor-
mally consists of two/three residual blocks where the stride of the
first convolutional layer in the block is set to 2 to downsample the
image; a naive decoding block (e.g. in hourglass structure) reveres
the encoding block and replaces its last convolutional layer with a
deconvolutional layer of stride 2 to upsample the image.
Hourglass is a very simple AE. Below we first introduce a multi-
scale lowpass objective to specifically improve its compressing
ability against adversarial/noisy perturbations.The encoder in Fig. 3
is only connected to the decoder through the network bottleneck,
which is weak.While the encoder is inherited from the classification
net and is untouched in our setting, we are free to design the decoder.
In order to better steer the image frequency in encoding blocks, we
further reform the decoding blocks into a pyramid structure which
separates the high-frequency band from each decoding output and
connects it to an encoding block for direct communication.
Multi-scale low-pass objective. Image noises including adversar-
ial perturbations happen to be high frequency in nature. Hence, we
believe each frequency band deserves a proper treatment. Inspired
by papers [5, 31] filtering out adversarial perturbations in certain
extent thanks to the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), we propose
a multi-scale low-pass objective to reconstruct the image gradually
from low-level structure to the high-level details.
Formally, let F represent the frequency map of an image I via the
full DCT transform, F = DCT(I ). F has the same sizeW ×H with I .
A lowpass filtered version is generated by removing high frequency
coefficients (see Fig. 2 first and third rows). The origin starts from
the top-left corner of the map where the DC component lies in.
Suppose that the decomposition hasM levels with a scale of 2. For
them-th level,m ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M−1}, the frequency map Fm has size
Wm =
W
2m and Hm =
H
2m and coefficients F
m
wh = Fwh ,∀(w,h) ∈
{1,Wm } × {1,Hm }. The lowpass filtered images I0, I1, ..., IM−1 are
obtained by applying inverse DCT on the M lowpass frequency
maps. Note that I0 is indeed the original image I .
Compared to using linear interpolation to generate multi-scale
ground truth, the proposed way provides a better feature steering
to reconstruct different levels of details.
Multi-scale high-frequency communication. Following the
notations above, we use I˜0,..., I˜M−1 to denote the reconstructed
output corresponding to the multi-scale lowpass ground truth I0,...,
IM−1. In the hourglass structure, the decoding blocks DM−1,..., D0
are chained in a reverse order of the encoding blocks E0,..., EM−1
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with deconvolutional layers. Notice DM−1 denotes a stack of multi-
ple decoding blocks to decode the compressed representation at the
bottleneck layer into I˜M−1. This image has the smallest size and con-
tains the low-frequency part; no ground truth is associated smaller
than that. The rest Dm denotes single decoding block. Similar inter-
pretation is for EM−1 and Em . The output of a given decoding block
Dm can thus be written as I˜m = Dm (Dm+1...(I˜M−1)). The decoding
ability of the AE is enhanced with multi-scale lowpass objective
by gradually restoring the high-frequency part of the image into
the output (see Fig. 3). Notwithstanding, our ultimate goal is to
improve the encoding ability of the AE to remove high-frequency
adversarial/noisy perturbations. Below we introduce our network
reformation inspired by Laplacian pyramid.
A Laplace pyramid represents an image by the decomposition
LP(I ) = [P0, ..., Pm , ..., IM−1], where P0, ..., Pm are the detail layers
(high-frequency bands) of the original image and IM−1 the lowest
resolution of the image (see Fig. 2 second and fourth rows). The
high frequency bands P0, ..., Pm are disjointed from the lowpass
images I0, ..., Im in the following way:
Pm = Im −U (Im+1) (1)
whereU is an upsampling operator.
Applying this pyramid to the decoder, each decoding block Dm
is reformed into two modules U and H as shown in Fig. 4: its
U module is an upsampling block operates on the output of the
previous decoding block Dm+1 chaining till IM−1 of the lowest
resolution.U in Dm reverses the corresponding Em and replaces its
last convolutional layer with a deconvolutional layer of stride 2 to
upsample the image. The H module is a 2-layer residual block [8]
connecting to the mirrored encoding block Em for high-frequency
communication. Assembling them we reconstruct the mth level
lowpass image with higher resolution than the previous level (m+1).
Analog to (1), the output I˜m of Dm is obtained by,
I˜m = U (I˜m+1) + H (Em ). (2)
Different levels of details are manipulated in the encoding blocks
through H : the high-frequency part of the image are gradually
compressed from the frontend to the bottleneck of the network.
The overall architecture is illustrated in Fig. 4. Similar to the
hourglass structure in Fig. 3, we also adopt a stack of multiple
decoding blocks denoted by DM−1 to upsample the compressed
representation from the bottleneck layer into the size of the (M−1)th
scale lowpass image and associate the first ground truth IM−1. These
decoding blocks share the same filter size, stride and number of
channels with that of EM−1. Unlike in Fig. 3, the output channel
of the last deconvolutional layer of DM−1 in Fig. 4 is reduced to 3
(or 1 for grey image) to directly produce the image IM−1. Notice
that it is important for DM−1 to upsample the latent feature map
into a reasonable size (e.g. 7 × 7) before reducing its channels.
The rest decoding blocks Dm consist of U and H modules. Each
U module is an upsampling block, which is indeed similar to the
naive decoding block in Fig. 3, but with its output channel being 3
(or 1). Each H module is a 2-layer residual block consisting of two
3 × 3 convolutional layers and one skip connection: the number
of channels of the first convoltuional layer is the same with its
connected encoding layer, while the number of output channels
of the second is set to 3 (or 1) for the same reason above; 1 × 1
convolutional layer is added on the skip connection to match the
number of channels from input to output.
3.4 Loss function
For image classification, we do not alter the training objective: the
commonly used loss function is the cross-entropy loss denoted by
Lcls . For image reconstruction, we adopt the pixel-wise MSE loss
between network prediction and ground truth. Referring to Sec. 3.3,
the reconstruction loss is defined over the multi-scale output of the
AE:
Lr ect = L0r ect + λ
M−1∑
m=1
Lmrect
= ∥I˜0 − I0∥22 + λ
M−1∑
m=1
∥I˜m − Im ∥22
(3)
where I˜0 and I˜m are the multi-scale reconstruction from the AE (see
Fig. 4). Parameter λ is the loss weight between the original scale
(I0) and other scales (Im ). M is the total number of scales which
should not be too large as the lowest resolution would become too
small to be sensible. In practice we make sure that no loss function
is associated for output size smaller than 7 × 7.
A multi-task loss function is defined over the image classification
and reconstruction branches, as L = Lcls +Lr ect . Notice that the
AE and classification net do not necessarily share the weights of
all the encoding layers, we will provide ablation study for this.
The network is in general trained in a joint learning manner
which is fast and effective. Nevertheless, on natural image dataset,
joint learning from scratch can be hard particularly for the AE. In
this context, we recommend an alternative learning manner: the AE
is trained on some epochs alone. Then, the weights of its encoder
are copied into the encoding blocks of the classifier, which in turn
is fine-tuned for some epochs. Then, the weights of its encoding
blocks are copied back to the encoder of the AE. After a few cycles,
both the AE and the classifier are on the right track, we can switch
to the joint learning. Inference of the classifier is disjointed from
the AE (upper branch in Fig. 4).
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. Experiments are conducted on three popular benchmarks
for adversarial learning: MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. MNIST
consists of 70,000 grayscale images of hand written digits, in which
60,000 of them are used for training and the remaining is for testing.
CIFAR-10 consists of 60,000 32x32 colour images in 10 classes, with
6,000 images per class. There are 50,000 training images and 10,000
test images. As for ImageNet, we use the same 1000 test images
from the NIPS 2017 adversarial defense challenge [15].
Implementation details. We choose by default ResNet-18 with
SGD optimiser trained on classification task. Its four encoding
blocks are taken as the encoder for the AE in Defend++. The decoder
design refers to Sec. 3.3. For MNIST, the initial learning rate is set
to 0.01 and is decayed by a factor of 10 every 100 epochs until 250
epochs. The momentum is 0.9, weight decay is 0.0005, batch size
is 256. For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, the initial learning rate is set
to 0.1 and is decayed by a factor of 10 every 100 epochs until 300
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Defend++ FGSM BIM C&W DDN Clean
1 shared block 84.78 53.09 98.95 98.97 99.42
2 shared blocks 85.20 50.52 98.99 98.95 99.39
3 shared blocks 86.48 54.56 99.14 99.16 99.42
4 shared blocks 86.81 55.37 99.08 99.10 99.47
ours w/o MS-LP 85.42 53.48 99.01 99.05 99.41
ours w/ MS-LI 85.17 46.90 99.03 99.04 99.39
ours 86.81 55.37 99.08 99.10 99.47
Hourglass 85.39 53.91 99.03 99.05 99.51
Hourglass+SC 84.40 51.61 90.00 99.10 99.42
Hourglass+SA 85.19 54.32 99.05 99.12 99.45
Table 1: Ablation study of different components of Defend++ on
MNIST dataset. Classification accuracy on adversarial and clean
examples are reported against several adversarial attacks. ours is
equivalent to 4 share blocks. MS-LP (multi-scale lowpass objective)
is applied to all the hourglass structures.
epochs. The momentum is 0.9, weight decay is 0.0005, and batch
size is 256. Parameter λ in (3) is set to 0.01.
Adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are generated from
the given classification network via representative methods i.e.
FGSM [29], BIM [13], C&W [4] and DDN [25]. For FGSM we set
by default the magnitude ϵ of adversarial perturbations as 0.2, 0.05
and 0.01 for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet, respectively; we also
evaluate the performance of different ϵ in Sec. 4.5. BIM and C&W
are iterative methods, we set the maximal iteration for BIM and
C&W to 100 and 5 × 20, respectively. DDN is a SOTA attack, we
use its public code to generate adversarial examples.
Adversarial defense and baseline.Adversarial training is a straight-
forward yet effective defense method. We adopt two schemes: one
is adversarial training with FGSM examples [29] (denoted by Adv.
FGSM) while the other is the proposed adversarial re-training with
DDN [25] (denoted by Adv. DDN). We also implement ComDe-
fend [10] using its published code. Our baseline is a classification
network without any defense mechanism.
Evaluation protocol.We evaluate the classification accuracy on
both the original and adversarial sets.
4.2 MNIST
We provide ablation study regarding the shared layers (ResNet
blocks) between the classification net and AE, multi-scale low-pass
objective and multi-scale high-frequency communication.
Shared layers between classification andAE. Recalling Sec. 3.4,
the AE and classification net does not need to share all encoding
layers. Our default classification net (ResNet-18) has four encoding
blocks. In Table 1, we ablate the number of their shared blocks
from 1 to 4. It turns out sharing four blocks performs best; the
classification accuracy on FGSM attack is 86.81 and on DDN is 99.10;
the performance of 3 shared blocks performs very close to that of 4
shared blocks. For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, the best performance
occurs when sharing three blocks. If not specified, all experiments
below follow this setting.
Multi-scale lowpass objective for AE. Table 1 also presents our
method without multi-scale low-pass objective (denoted by ours
w/o MS-LP); the result ours is indeed the same with that of 4 shared
blocks. The proposed MS-LP clearly improves the defense accuracy
FGSM BIM C&W DDN Clean
No defense 31.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.60
Adv. FGSM 99.77 9.86 99.04 99.05 99.51
Adv. DDN 95.21 19.55 98.66 98.66 98.94
ComDefend 85.69 19.04 98.87 98.82 99.43
ComDefend-wb 19.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.43
ours 86.81 55.37 99.08 99.10 99.47
ours + GN 90.56 56.44 98.97 98.98 99.41
Table 2: Classification accuracy on adversarial and clean examples
of selected defense methods. Experiment on MNIST dataset.
on nearly every attack as well as the clean image set. To further
investigate its effectiveness, we offer the result of using linear inter-
polation instead for multi-scale ground truth (denoted by ours w/
MS-LI). Its performance is in general inferior to ours. For instance,
the accuracy is 85.17 v.s. 86.81 on FGSM; 46.90 v.s. 55.37 on BIM.
Multi-scale high-frequency communication for AE.We com-
pare to the basic hourglass structure in Fig. 3. The result in Table 1
shows that Hourglass produces accuracy clearly lower than ours on
every entry. As being suggested, the connection between encoder
and decoder in the basic hourglass structure is only through the
bottleneck, which is weak. In order to enhance this connection,
we could add skip connections similar to U-Net [24], where cor-
responding encoding and decoding blocks (e.g. Em and Dm ) are
connected using identity mappings. The feature tensors from two
branches can be either concatenated or element-wise added, which
we denote as Hourglass-SC and Hourglass-SA, respectively. Results
in Table 1 show no significant improvement over the basic Hour-
glass, and are even worse on some attacks (e.g. 85.19 v.s. 85.39 on
FGSM). Hourglass-SA is slightly better than Hourglass-SC yet is
still inferior to ours. Our network reformation offers more elaborate
frequency-steering for encoding and decoding blocks, compared to
the straightforward skip connection on Hourglass. Hence, it ends
up with a more robust defense against various adversarial attacks.
Comparison with representative defense methods. Table 2
compares Defend++ to adversarial trainingwith FGSM (Adv. FGSM),
adversarial re-training with DDN (Adv. DDN) [25], ComDefend [10]
and baseline (No defense). Defend++ significantly improves the per-
formance of the baseline over any adversarial attack. The baseline
and Defend++ are both trained with clean images only. Defend++ is
inferior to Adv. FGSM on the FGSM attack (86.81 v.s. 99.77) because
Adv. FGSM is specifically trained for this attack. However, Defend++
shows a strong generalization ability compared to Adv. FGSM. For
instance, it is 55.37 v.s. 9.86 on BIM. BIM is the strongest attack
which causes quite visible image distortion (see Fig. 5). Adv.DDN is
indeed adversarial retraining where adversarial examples are online
updated. This is very slow. More epochs are needed to obtain better
performance [25]. In contrast, Defend++ trains with clean images
and is much faster.
Performance of ComDefend is also reported under our setting,
which performs close to Adv. DDN but in a grey-box scenario: the
attacker is oblivious to the reformer (AE) in front of the classifi-
cation net [10] (see Sec. 2). In a fair comparison with Defend++,
where the reformer is known to the attacker in white-box scenario,
ComDefend is no better than the baseline (see ComDefend-wb in
Table 2). Our work is similar in spirit to ComDefend that we do not
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FGSM BIM C&W DDN Clean
No defense 38.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.80
Adv. FGSM 74.01 11.68 89.63 89.46 91.30
Adv. DDN 68.88 14.42 86.93 86.90 86.94
ComDefend 58.06 23.60 77.41 76.28 87.58
ours 64.63 16.76 89.78 89.83 93.22
ours + GN 67.42 18.12 89.95 88.76 92.05
Table 3: Classification accuracy on CIFAR-10 dataset.
FGSM BIM C&W DDN Clean
No defense 13.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 71.25
Adv. FGSM 58.30 10.65 43.45 44.85 52.75
ours 56.45 40.85 54.85 56.35 62.45
Table 4: Classification accuracy on ImageNet dataset.
Clean                   FGSM                  BIM                    C&W                    DDN         
Figure 5: Illustration of adversarial examples.
use any adversarial examples for training. Nonetheless, ComDefend
adds Gaussian noises (GN) to image representations in the reformer
to improve the defending performance. By doing the same, we can
further obtain our results (see ours + GN): 90.56, 56.44, 98.97, 98.98
on FGSM, BIM, C&W, DDN and clean examples, respectively; the
accuracy is clearly improved by +3.75% and +1.13% on FGSM and
BIM, while slightly declined on C&W, DDN and clean examples.
Before the end, two more points are worth noting: 1) there exists
a similar representative attack to BIM, the projected gradient de-
scent (PGD) [20]. They have the same multi-step generation process
yet PGD uses uniform random noise as initialization. The testing
results against PGD attack (100 iterations) on MNIST are indeed
similar to BIM: 0.0, 5.12, 16.6, 15.24, 48.53 for No defense, Adv.
FGSM, Adv. DDN, ComDefend, and our Defend++, respectively;
Defend++ is clearly the best. On the other hand, for adversarial
training with PGD (Adv. PGD) on MNIST, it is very slow and we
got accuracy 83.62, 36.71, 97.97, 97.99, 61.14, 98.54 for FGSM, BIM,
C&W, DDN, PGD, clean examples, respectively; Defend++ is in
general better than this Adv. PGD. 2) We notice that even those
degraded versions of Defend++, e.g. ours w/o MS-LP or Hourglass
in Table 2, perform much better than the baseline and competitive
to other representative defense methods. This validates our idea
in general of reinforcing the DNN bottleneck of a classifier with
an AE for adversarial defense, which can significantly improve the
defense universality, without the need of adversarial training or
pre-processing head.
4.3 CIFAR-10
Table 3 presents the results on CIFAR-10. Like in Table 2, Defend++
significantly improves the defense performance over the baseline
(No defense) on all the attacks. It is also clearly better than Adv.
FGSM/DDN and ComDefend on C&W and DDN attacks while infe-
rior to Adv. FGSM on FGSM attack (64.63 v.s. 74.01) and ComDefend
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Figure 6: Defend++ against different distortions.
Figure 7: First and second rows: clean images and their re-
constructed results via our AE. Third and fourth rows: ad-
versarial images and their reconstructed results via our AE.
on BIM attack (16.76 v.s. 23.60). It maintains a relatively good accu-
racy on the clean set (93.22) while the others clearly drop (91.30,
86.94, and 87.58). Our Defend++ uses only clean images for training.
Similar to that in Table 2, we also add Gaussian noises (GN) dur-
ing training as in [10]: the results are further improved especially
against simple attacks (FGSM and BIM) but the accuracy on clean
images drops by one point (see Table 3, ours + GN).
4.4 ImageNet
Results on ImageNet are reported in Table 4. The No defense base-
line demonstrates a total failure on BIM, C&W, and DDN while our
Defend++ substantially improves it. Defend++ also yields better re-
sult than Adv.FGSM on every attack except FGSM, where it is fairly
lower as Adv.FGSM is trained with FGSM examples. Notice that
experiments on ImageNet are only trained with a subset (around
10k images) of it for fast implementation so the overall accuracy is
not very high. Fig. 5 shows examples of attacked images. One can
clearly see that BIM attack is more visible.
4.5 Analysis and Discussion
We offer more analysis and discussion on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Accuracy against various target distortions.We vary the mag-
nitude ϵ of FGSM perturbations for Defend++ from 0.1 to 1.0. The
accuracy on MNIST is illustrated in Fig. 6. By adopting Defend++,
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Figure 8: Frequency histogram of R.
MNIST FGSM BIM C&W DDN Clean
No defense (VGG16) 39.79 11.68 0.00 17.68 99.54
ours (VGG16) 70.27 23.17 99.22 95.63 98.84
No defense (ResNet-50) 19.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.65
ours (ResNet-50) 87.73 54.80 99.25 99.27 99.6
Table 5: Experiments on MNIST dataset with classification net be-
ing VGG16 and ResNet-50.
CIFAR-10 FGSM BIM C&W DDN Clean
No defense (VGG16) 35.24 7.23 0.00 0.00 88.25
ours (VGG16) 56.81 21.35 81.93 81.84 86.60
No defense (ResNet-50) 23.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.97
ours (ResNet-50) 79.18 48.76 90.52 90.59 93.85
Table 6: Experiments on CIFAR-10 dataset with classification net
being VGG16 and ResNet-50.
Classifier VGG16 ResNet-50 ResNet-18
Attack VGG16 ResNet-18 ResNet-50 ResNet-18 ResNet-18 VGG16
No defense 39.79 52.73 19.54 33.28 31.94 35.41
ours 70.27 76.09 87.73 90.47 86.81 89.39
Table 7: Evaluation of universality of Defend++ on MNIST.
the baseline curve is substantially shifted to the right. This clearly
shows that our method improves the robustness of the classification
network. The attacker has to almost double the distortion budget.
Removal of adversarial perturbations. The whole AE is not
part of the classification model, but for illustration purpose, we
inspect its capability of removing adversarial noises (FGSM) on
MNIST. The reconstructed images shown in Fig. 7 are much cleaner
than the adversarial images. Quantitatively, we compute the Eu-
clidean distances from the reconstructed image to its corresponding
attacked image (Dra ) and to its clean image (Drc ). Fig. 8 shows that
the ratio R = Drc/Dra always falls into the interval (0, 1): The
reconstruction is always closer to the clean image than to the at-
tacked one. This proves that the AE succeeds to filter out most of
the adversarial perturbation.
Networks and universality. So far, we choose ResNet-18 as our
classification net, but Defend++ can adapt any network with the
same training procedure (see Sec. 4.1). Here, we select VGG16 and
ResNet-50 as the alternative classification nets. For VGG16, we take
its 13 convolutional layers as the encoder of AE, every two/three
convolutional layers with one pooling layer in the VGGnet are taken
as one block. We let AE share the first two block weights with the
classification net. For ResNet-50, we take its first four encoding
Classifier VGG16 ResNet-50 ResNet-18
Attack VGG16 ResNet-18 ResNet-50 ResNet-18 ResNet-18 VGG16
No defense 35.24 47.49 23.45 41.39 38.35 46.18
ours 56.81 64.22 79.18 86.13 64.63 75.45
Table 8: Evaluation of universality of Defend++ on CIFAR-10.
blocks as the encoder of the AE and share their encoding weights.
The results are shown in Table 5 and 6 on MNIST and CIFAR-10,
respectively. Defend++ on VGG16 and ResNet-50 clearly improves
the baseline on both adversarial and clean examples, which shows
the generalizability of our method on different networks. Notice
that 1) the results on ResNet-50 are also slightly better than those on
ResNet-18 (Table 2 and 3), as ResNet-50 is a more powerful network;
2) the FGSM, BIM, C&W results (79.18, 48.76, 90.52) on ResNet-50,
CIFAR-10 are also comparable to ComDefend [10] under similar
setting (e.g. 83, 34, 87 for L∞ = 16 in its Table 5): ours performs
better on BIM and C&W attacks. More importantly, ours are pure
white-box classifiers, contrary to ComDefend where the upfront
reformer is not public (see Sec 4.2).
Defend++ enhances the network defense against universal ad-
versarial perturbations by removing them from the bottleneck rep-
resentations. From this point of view, we expect that Defend++ can
defend adversarial perturbations generated from different models.
We use Defend++ trained on one network to defend against ad-
versarial examples generated from another network. Results are
reported on FGSM examples amid ResNet-18, ResNet-50 and VGG16
in Table 8 and 7. Having a look at the tables, the first row signifies
the classification network we use for testing while the second row
signifies the classification network we use for adversary generation.
For instance, given a classifier VGG16, its adversarial examples
can be generated using the same VGG16 or using ResNet-18. De-
fend++ is not a gradient-masking based approach like [2, 9, 22, 23];
the results show that Defend++ significantly improves the perfor-
mance over baseline in the transfer setting, which demonstrates
its strong universality. Furthermore, comparing the cross-model
performance with that using the same model, it is apparent that
our Defend++ performs even better on the cross-model. Take the
ResNet-50 classifier as an example, its accuracy on attacks from
the same ResNet-50 is 87.73 and 79.18 on MNIST and CIFAR-10,
respectively; on attacks from ResNet-18 is improved to 90.47 and
86.13 correspondingly. Adversarial examples generated from the
same model with the classifier is harder to defend.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a DNN bottleneck reinforcement scheme for
universal adversarial defense (Defend++). It learns an auto-encoder
jointly with the classifier by sharing the same encoding parameters
of the network. The auto-encoder improves the classifier’s com-
pressing ability by removing the adversarial/noisy perturbations at
its encoding stage. Multi-scale low-pass objective and multi-scale
high-frequency communication is also introduced at training to
further improve the robustness of the network. Defend++ is trained
with clean images only and without changing the classification
structure. Thorough experiments show that, compared to other
representative methods, Defend++ is an effective defense against
various attacks at very low cost.
Defending Adversarial Examples via DNN Bottleneck Reinforcement MM ’20, October 12–16, 2020, Seattle, WA, USA.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Founda-
tion of China (NSFC) under Grant No. 61828602 and 51475334; as
well as National Key Research and Development Program of Sci-
ence and Technology of China under Grant No. 2018YFB1305304,
Shanghai Science and Technology Pilot Project under Grant No.
19511132100, and the French ANR chair SAIDA.
REFERENCES
[1] Yassine Bakhti, Sid Ahmed Fezza, Wassim Hamidouche, and Olivier Déforges.
2019. DDSA: a Defense against Adversarial Attacks using Deep Denoising Sparse
Autoencoder. IEEE Access 7 (2019), 160397–160407.
[2] Jacob Buckman, Aurko Roy, Colin Raffel, and Ian Goodfellow. 2018. Thermometer
encoding: One hot way to resist adversarial examples. In ICLR.
[3] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily
Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methods. In ACM Workshop on Artificial
Intelligence and Security.
[4] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Towards evaluating the robustness of
neural networks. In IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy.
[5] Gintare Karolina Dziugaite, Zoubin Ghahramani, and Daniel M Roy. 2016. A
study of the effect of jpg compression on adversarial images. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1608.00853 (2016).
[6] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2015. Explaining and
harnessing adversarial examples. In ICLR.
[7] Shixiang Gu and Luca Rigazio. 2014. Towards deep neural network architectures
robust to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.5068 (2014).
[8] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2016. Deep residual
learning for image recognition. In CVPR.
[9] Yingying Hua, Shiming Ge, Xindi Gao, Xin Jin, and Dan Zeng. 2019. Defending
Against Adversarial Examples via Soft Decision Trees Embedding. In ACM MM.
[10] Xiaojun Jia, XingxingWei, Xiaochun Cao, and Hassan Foroosh. 2019. ComDefend:
An Efficient Image CompressionModel to DefendAdversarial Examples. InCVPR.
[11] Linxi Jiang, Xingjun Ma, Shaoxiang Chen, James Bailey, and Yu-Gang Jiang. 2019.
Black-box adversarial attacks on video recognition models. In ACM MM.
[12] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton. 2012. Imagenet classifi-
cation with deep convolutional neural networks. In NIPS.
[13] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. 2017. Adversarial machine
learning at scale. In ICLR.
[14] X. Li and F. Li. 2017. Adversarial Examples Detection in Deep Networks with
Convolutional Filter Statistics. In ICCV.
[15] Fangzhou Liao, Ming Liang, Yinpeng Dong, Tianyu Pang, Xiaolin Hu, and Jun
Zhu. 2018. Defense against adversarial attacks using high-level representation
guided denoiser. In CVPR.
[16] Zihao Liu, Qi Liu, Tao Liu, Yanzhi Wang, and Wujie Wen. 2019. Feature Dis-
tillation: DNN-Oriented JPEG Compression Against Adversarial Examples. In
CVPR.
[17] Jiajun Lu, Theerasit Issaranon, and David Forsyth. 2017. SafetyNet: Detecting
and Rejecting Adversarial Examples Robustly. In ICCV.
[18] Chen Ma, Chenxu Zhao, Hailin Shi, Li Chen, Junhai Yong, and Dan Zeng. 2019.
MetaAdvDet: Towards Robust Detection of Evolving Adversarial Attacks. In
ACM MM.
[19] Shiqing Ma, Yingqi Liu, Guanhong Tao, Wen-Chuan Lee, and Xiangyu Zhang.
2019. NIC: Detecting Adversarial Samples with Neural Network Invariant Check-
ing. In NDSS.
[20] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and
Adrian Vladu. 2017. Towards deep learningmodels resistant to adversarial attacks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083 (2017).
[21] Dongyu Meng and Hao Chen. 2017. Magnet: a two-pronged defense against
adversarial examples. In ACM SIGSAC.
[22] Aran Nayebi and Surya Ganguli. 2017. Biologically inspired protection of deep
networks from adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.09202 (2017).
[23] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram Swami.
2016. Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural
networks. In IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy.
[24] Olaf Ronneberger, Philipp Fischer, and Thomas Brox. 2015. U-net: Convolutional
networks for biomedical image segmentation. In MICCAI.
[25] Jérôme Rony, Luiz GHafemann, Luiz S Oliveira, Ismail Ben Ayed, Robert Sabourin,
and Eric Granger. 2019. Decoupling direction and norm for efficient gradient-
based l2 adversarial attacks and defenses. In CVPR.
[26] Andrew Michael Saxe, Yamini Bansal, Joel Dapello, Madhu Advani, Artemy
Kolchinsky, Brendan Daniel Tracey, and David Daniel Cox. 2018. On the Infor-
mation Bottleneck Theory of Deep Learning. In ICLR.
[27] Miaojing Shi, Zhaohui Yang, Chao Xu, and Qijun Chen. 2019. Revisiting perspec-
tive information for efficient crowd counting. In CVPR.
[28] Yang Song, Taesup Kim, Sebastian Nowozin, Stefano Ermon, and Nate Kushman.
2017. Pixeldefend: Leveraging generative models to understand and defend
against adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.10766 (2017).
[29] Christian Szegedy,Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan,
Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2014. Intriguing properties of neural networks.
In ICLR.
[30] Olga Taran, Shideh Rezaeifar, Taras Holotyak, and Slava Voloshynovskiy. 2019.
Defending against adversarial attacks by randomized diversification. In CVPR.
[31] Weilin Xu, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi. 2017. Feature squeezing: Detecting
adversarial examples in deep neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.01155
(2017).
[32] Zhaohui Yang, Miaojing Shi, Yannis Avrithis, Chao Xu, and Vittorio Ferrari. 2019.
Training Object Detectors from FewWeakly-Labeled andMany Unlabeled Images.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.00384 (2019).
[33] Pu Zhao, Sijia Liu, Yanzhi Wang, and Xue Lin. 2018. An admm-based universal
framework for adversarial attacks on deep neural networks. In ACM MM.
